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Young People Need Islam as a Coherent Intellectual Framework

Aasim Iftekhar · · Philosophy & Kalam · 18 min read

Young People Need Islam as a Coherent Intellectual Framework

A review of the intellectual tendencies of young Muslims today, together with their mental and psychological circumstances, reveals something important: a considerable number of them do not wish to understand Islam merely as a collection of religious rulings. Rather, they seek to understand it as a coherent intellectual framework in which God, the human being, the universe, knowledge, morality, society, and the different spheres of human life are connected by rational and disciplined relationships.

There is no doubt that young people face numerous questions arising from atheism, alienation from religion, skepticism, and modern Western ideas. Yet more fundamental than all these problems is the intellectual fragmentation experienced by many young Muslims. They possess information about Islam, but lack a method by which that information can be understood as a connected body of knowledge and thought.

A young person hears arguments for the existence of God, discussions establishing prophethood, debates about the authority of the Qur'an and Hadith, legal opinions on questions of jurisprudence, and sermons on moral formation. At times, they are also impressed by discussions of Islam's economic and political systems. Yet it remains unclear to them how all these subjects relate to one another. Which issue depends upon which other issue? What is foundational, and what follows from it? What principles connect all these discussions at the levels of knowledge and reason?

The problem is therefore not simply a lack of information, but a failure to grasp the epistemological and inferential relationships between the different pieces of information.

The intellectual and psychological crisis of young people

Young people today grow up in a cultural and intellectual environment in which various systems of thought—sometimes even mutually contradictory ones—simultaneously influence their minds.

In modern educational institutions, they encounter mechanistic interpretations of the universe; through the social sciences, they study different accounts of human beings and society; in modern political thought, they encounter particular understandings of freedom, equality, rights, and the state. Social media, meanwhile, continuously exposes them to material concerning atheism, religious reformism, and different sectarian interpretations.

An important characteristic of all these intellectual tendencies is that they do not merely express opinions about isolated issues. They also offer a particular perspective from which human beings, society, and the universe are to be understood.

By contrast, Islam is generally presented to young people in the form of separate, unconnected components of knowledge and practice.

As a result, they experience a kind of division between their religious identity and their intellectual and rational outlook. As Muslims, they remain attached to Islam; but they cannot clearly see how Islamic beliefs and rulings relate to the concepts and standards of knowledge formed in their minds through modern education.

In these circumstances, some restrict religious life to an emotional and spiritual attachment; others begin reinterpreting Islamic teachings in light of modern ideas; and still others experience an intellectual anxiety in which the very status of religion as a form of knowledge becomes questionable.

There is another psychological dimension that deserves attention.

Young people do not merely want to know what Islam rules on a particular matter. They also want to understand the intellectual basis of that ruling, its rational justification, and its place within the Islamic system of thought. Referring only to a particular person or religious authority does not always resolve their questions.

This is not necessarily because they reject religious authority, but because their minds already contain certain conceptions of knowledge, evidence, and truth through which they try to understand every claim.

The present intellectual crisis of young Muslims, then, is not fundamentally a crisis of doubts about beliefs and rulings alone. To a certain extent, it is also a crisis concerning the very concepts of knowledge, reality, and reasoning.

The question now is whether our scholarly tradition ever developed a disciplined attempt to understand and present Islam as such a coherent intellectual system.

In my view, the answer lies in one of the most significant yet largely neglected parts of our intellectual heritage: the scholarly and inferential method of the mutakallimūn (theologians) and fuqahāʾ (jurists).

If we confine the achievements of theologians and jurists to the defense of doctrine and the derivation of legal rulings, we cannot fully appreciate the actual nature of their intellectual work.

An especially important aspect of their efforts was that they connected the different components of Islamic thought through principled relationships of reasoning. Through these relationships, a person could undertake a disciplined intellectual journey from the nature of knowledge to the existence of God, prophethood, revelation, morality, and the rulings of the Sharia.

For example, the theologians did not necessarily begin their discussions simply by proving the existence of God. Before that, they examined basic questions such as the nature of knowledge, the possibility of knowing, and the sources of knowledge.

On what basis does a human being know anything? What distinguishes knowledge from conjecture? What epistemic standing do the senses, reason, and transmitted reports possess? And by what decisive principle is the truth or falsehood of a claim to be determined?

These inquiries are not merely philosophical subtleties; they relate directly to the epistemological foundations of Islamic belief.

That is why even a concise work such as al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyyah gives fundamental importance to the discussion of the sources of knowledge, and recognizes sound senses, truthful report, and reason as valid means of acquiring knowledge.

Having established this epistemological foundation, the theologians turned to questions of existence and nonexistence, origination and eternity (ḥudūth and qidam). In light of these discussions, they developed rational arguments concerning the reality of the universe, the nature of its existence, and the existence of God.

Discussions then proceed to the divine attributes, divine actions, prophethood, miracles, and revelation.

Throughout this sequence, the important concern is to determine the epistemic status of each question and the method appropriate for establishing it.

Where a proposition can be established through reason, rational arguments are presented. Where knowledge of a matter depends on truthful transmission, the truthfulness and authority of that report provide the foundation.

Thus, instead of splitting reason and revelation into two opposing, self-contained civilizational camps, the scholars sought to determine their respective epistemic standing, scope, and relationship.

The intellectual work of the jurists and scholars of legal theory then comes into view.

Once the authority of prophethood and revelation had been established, the next question was: according to what method should rulings for the various aspects of human life be derived from revelation?

How is the signification of scriptural texts determined? What distinguishes the general from the particular, the unrestricted from the restricted, literal meaning from figurative meaning, and the apparent from the interpreted? What principles govern preference when evidences appear to conflict? And how can a legal ruling be reached on matters for which no explicit text exists?

Uṣūl al-fiqh, or Islamic legal theory, offers disciplined answers to these questions.

In the Hanafi tradition in particular, discussions of analogical reasoning (qiyās), juristic preference (istiḥsān), custom (ʿurf), and the indications of texts (dalālāt al-nuṣūṣ) are not merely techniques for deriving legal rulings. Underlying them is a much wider conception of the relationships between reasoning, language, meaning, and judgment.

Here, istiḥsān does not signify personal preference or an unrestricted opinion; it is a disciplined departure from an apparent analogy on specific principled grounds.

Likewise, discussions of the objectives of the Sharia and the wisdom of its rulings add another dimension to this framework, allowing the relationships between individual rulings and human and collective welfare to be understood.

The intellectual efforts of Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafiʿi legal theorists need to be viewed within this wider setting.

It must also be remembered that the schools of theologians and jurists differed on numerous foundational and subsidiary questions. Yet, despite these differences, they shared a prominent scholarly feature: claims were to be understood through the appropriate evidences, principles, and methods, and no particular question should be detached from its fundamental epistemological and inferential context.

In my view, it is precisely this intellectual and scholarly continuity that young people need today.

This raises another question: if our intellectual tradition contained such a disciplined and coherent system of thought, how did Muslims today—especially those educated in modern institutions—become so distant from it?

To answer this question, we must consider the intellectual, cultural, and political transformations of the past two centuries.

Western colonialism affected Muslim societies not only politically and economically. Alongside it came profound changes in the classification of the sciences, the standing accorded to different sources of knowledge, and the standards by which reality was understood.

Within different traditions of modern Western thought, particularly empiricism, physical materialism, and certain positivist tendencies, views of knowledge and reality emerged that challenged the scholarly status of metaphysical inquiries.

My intention is not to reduce modern Western thought to a single doctrine, for it contains numerous mutually opposed positions on epistemology and metaphysics. Nonetheless, one prominent feature of the ideas that became especially influential through modern education in Muslim societies was the exceptional centrality given to the empirical sciences.

Consequently, on one side there continued an educational system teaching the sciences related to the Qur'an and Sunnah on the basis of the tradition of theologians and jurists, while on the other side a class educated in modern institutions developed within an intellectual environment whose underlying concepts, terminology, and standards differed from those of the traditional Islamic sciences.

This division gradually ceased to be merely a division between educational institutions and became an increasingly deep distance at the intellectual level.

For the modern-educated Muslim, questions of origination (ḥudūth), eternity (qidam), rational and scriptural indication, analogy, and ijtihād came to seem little more than terminology belonging to ancient sciences and logic. Meanwhile, the fundamental problems that theologians and legal theorists examined through these concepts slipped from view.

On the other side, much of the madrasa system continued to teach these disciplines, but their active engagement with changing intellectual and cultural circumstances was not always developed to the required extent.

The result was that one group possessed contemporary questions and terminology but was not fully acquainted with the fundamental methods of the Islamic scholarly tradition. Another possessed the texts and terms of that tradition, yet in many cases its practical and research engagement with the questions generated by the modern world was limited.

In these circumstances, the call for a “new theology” (jadīd ʿilm al-kalām) gained momentum and all the conditions for its popularity were present. At the same time, vigorous propaganda against the methods of the traditional theologians and jurists had led those methods to be regarded as obsolete and lacking scholarly foundations.

Another significant cause of this intellectual discontinuity was the internal sectarian conflict that developed in Muslim societies, particularly in the Indian subcontinent, over the last century and a half.

There is no doubt that not every disagreement among religious schools can be dismissed as unimportant or merely subsidiary. Some concern important questions of belief, principles, and religious interpretation, and warrant serious scholarly discussion and research in their own right.

The issue, however, is not the existence of disagreements, but the priorities of scholarly work and the use of collective intellectual energies.

A considerable share of the abilities of our scholarly class came to be devoted to sectarian debates, internal polemics, the defense of individuals and organizations, and the details of mutual disagreements.

The greatest loss arising from this situation was that fundamental epistemological, philosophical, and civilizational questions raised by the modern West—questions affecting the intellectual life of the whole Muslim community—did not receive the place they deserved among our collective scholarly priorities.

This is the central problem we need to grasp.

While modern thought was questioning basic concepts of existence, the possibility of knowledge, moral values, religious knowledge, human freedom, and collective life, much of our intellectual energy was occupied by internal debates whose consequences were often confined to particular sectarian identities.

This produced a second kind of harm.

An image of traditional religious scholars became increasingly prominent among young people in which sectarian defense, disputation, accusations of unbelief, and accusations of deviation appeared to outweigh intellectual inquiry and research.

It would certainly be unfair to treat this image as representative of the entire scholarly landscape. Yet it is also true that our own scholarly and collective conduct played a part in creating that impression.

Over time, some young people came to perceive the tradition of theologians and jurists as one more concerned with internal religious disputes than with fundamental human questions.

The reality, however, was quite the opposite.

The disciplines presented merely as instruments of sectarian defense were grounded in the most basic questions of existence, knowledge, reality, reasoning, morality, law, and human life. Some individuals did make efforts on this foundation. Yet, despite their efforts, a sufficiently strong collective scholarly culture did not emerge to present the foundational epistemological tradition of Islamic thought to new generations in a coherent form while engaging contemporary intellectual problems.

One major result of this entire situation was an intellectual vacuum among modern-educated Muslims.

On one side stood modern Western ideas, with their distinctive epistemological, cultural, and social assumptions; on the other, the coherent form of the Islamic scholarly tradition had largely moved beyond their reach.

But the human mind does not tolerate intellectual disconnectedness for long.

It seeks, at some level, to connect beliefs, ideas, and actions. That is why, whenever a thinker, writer, or movement offered a comparatively coherent and comprehensive interpretation of Islam, it gained exceptional popularity among a section of Muslims, particularly modern-educated young people.

This tendency has appeared in different forms throughout the last century and a half of Islamic intellectual history.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan sought to reinterpret religious texts in the light of modern rational and naturalistic concepts. Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, departing from the traditional position on the authority of Hadith and inherited jurisprudence, attempted to present a complete system of Islam on the basis of the Qur'an.

Similarly, some modern Islamic movements presented Islam as an all-encompassing ideology for political, economic, and social life. In the present digital era, various speakers and religious personalities offer young people comprehensive pictures of Islam in which answers to their different questions appear to fit together.

It would be incorrect to assign all these efforts the same scholarly rank or to treat all their interpretations as equivalent. Their aims, methods of argument, intellectual foundations, and conclusions differ considerably.

Some attempted to reconcile religious thought with modern epistemology; some adopted new interpretations of the sources of Sharia; some gave central importance to Islam's social and political dimensions; and others merely offered a simple, apparently integrated understanding of religious issues at a popular level.

Yet there is certainly a common element in the popularity of these varied attempts: the desire to understand Islam as a coherent framework of thought.

This is a highly important aspect that leadership associated with the theologians and jurists has not sufficiently made a subject of research.

Young people are not attracted to an interpretation simply because it is new or because it departs from traditional scholars. Often, the principal attraction is that it gives them an intelligible connection between different elements of Islam.

But a fundamental scholarly question arises here.

Is the coherence of a system of thought sufficient to establish its correctness?

Clearly, it is not.

An apparently very coherent intellectual system can be constructed upon a false epistemological foundation. Similarly, if a particular theory is first assumed to be correct and different texts and evidences are arranged to conform to it, a picture may emerge whose parts appear closely connected even though the epistemological and inferential basis of that connection is weak. The Farahi–Ghamidi school of thought can be considered in this regard: despite what I regard as its scholarly weaknesses, it remains attractive to minds that want to see things as an integrated whole.

At this point, a fundamental distinction emerges between the method of theologians and jurists and certain modern interpretations of Islam.

For the theologians and legal theorists, the primary questions were: what is the epistemic standing of a claim, what valid means can establish it, and what disciplined principle determines preference between different evidences?

By contrast, some modern interpretations have concentrated on arranging religious teachings under an overall conception already fixed in advance.

As a result, certain modern political, social, or philosophical concepts have sometimes been elevated to the level of governing universals, and Islamic texts and rulings have then been interpreted in their light.

This creates a crucial distinction.

One approach understands modern problems through the fundamental epistemological and methodological concepts of Islamic thought; the other takes the fundamental concepts of modern thought as its standard and arranges the different parts of Islam accordingly.

Both approaches may appear to present Islam as a coherent system. In the first, however, the method that produces coherence is drawn from the Islamic scholarly tradition, while in the second the concepts that organize Islamic teachings may be borrowed from another intellectual system.

In other words, the particulars remain Islamic, but the universals that arrange them become modern.

This is especially significant because young people do not generally recognize the internal epistemological problems of a comprehensive interpretation immediately. Its apparent coherence and ready answers to different questions attract them.

Yet when these interpretations confront more fundamental scholarly and research questions, their internal contradictions and weaknesses of reasoning sometimes begin to appear.

The harm is not confined to any particular thinker or movement; some young people begin to mistake the weakness of an interpretation for a weakness in the intellectual foundations of Islam itself.

A second intellectual crisis is thus created.

After all this discussion, the central question is how we can find a way out of this crisis.

Its solution lies neither in complete disengagement from modern intellectual tendencies nor in producing new interpretations of Islam that uncritically accept the intellectual and cultural assumptions of the modern world.

What is needed is to understand the scholarly methods of the theologians and jurists in their full intellectual depth, explain their foundational concepts anew, and investigate the problems of the modern world in the light of their principles.

The first requirement for doing this is a change in our scholarly priorities.

We must recognize that the questions of today's young people are not limited to a handful of atheistic doubts or contemporary social issues. Behind them lie fundamental assumptions about knowledge, reality, humanity, the universe, and morality.

Until these assumptions are examined, answers to the particular questions arising from them will have no more than limited usefulness.

For example, when a young person questions the existence of God, the problem may not simply be difficulty understanding a particular proof. Their conception of knowledge and evidence may be such that they refuse, from the outset, to recognize any metaphysical argument as valid.

Likewise, when they object to a religious ruling, we need to ask what grounds that objection. Do they fail to understand the wisdom behind the ruling? Or do they approach it through prior conceptions of justice, freedom, rights, and morality?

In the first case, explaining the wisdom of the ruling may help. In the second, those underlying ethical and philosophical concepts must themselves become the subject of discussion.

It is precisely because we overlook this distinction that so much of our religious discourse remains restricted to immediate and fragmented answers.

Madrasas and religious educational institutions also bear a particularly important responsibility in this regard.

Rather than teaching kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh merely as inherited historical books, read almost for the sake of blessing, we must reconnect the foundational questions of these disciplines with living intellectual questions.

For example, the theologians' theory of knowledge can be taught alongside contemporary epistemology; their ontological and physical conceptions alongside relevant questions in the modern philosophy of natural science; and discussions in legal theory alongside contemporary philosophy of law, linguistics, and moral philosophy, through critical and comparative study.

The purpose is not to dissolve these disciplines into modern sciences, but to use them to develop a mode of critique in which the fundamental assumptions, methods, and conclusions of every scholarly tradition can be examined independently and systematically.

Similarly, curricula must be developed for modern-educated young people that introduce them to the foundational epistemological sequence of Islamic thought.

Such curricula must do more than provide information about beliefs and rulings. They must clarify the intellectual relationships among the nature of knowledge, existence, theology, prophethood, revelation, principles of reasoning, legal theory, morality, and society.

This cannot be accomplished through a few lectures or debates. It requires a structured curriculum, gradual progression, research, study, and scholarly training.

It is also crucial that our presentation of Islamic thought should not be merely defensive.

The need for kalām does not arise only when someone denies God's existence or objects to an Islamic belief.

One fundamental role of this discipline is to engage in disciplined rational inquiry through which human beings understand truth, existence, and knowledge themselves.

Similarly, the significance of uṣūl al-fiqh is not restricted to resolving a few disputed legal questions; it is an independent scholarly method for understanding the inferential relationships between texts, meanings, evidences, and rulings.

When these disciplines are presented in their foundational capacity, Islamic thought will no longer appear to young people merely as a religious discourse occupied with defending itself. It can also be seen as a serious scholarly method for understanding reality and human life.

A common objection to this approach is that these sciences are not meant to be taught to the general public, and many eminent scholars have issued statements and cautions on the matter. But social and intellectual circumstances have changed fundamentally over the past hundred years. Previously, there might have been only a handful of literate, educated people in a neighborhood. Today, a large portion of the population encounters Western concepts and epistemological assumptions, and there are very many university graduates. To treat a graduate like an ordinary illiterate person is unfair. Their level of intellectual awareness differs, and that awareness demands that they understand matters at a conceptual and theoretical level. In these circumstances, arranging for them to acquire at least some principled knowledge has become indispensable.

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